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Establishing a Right to Last Rites: Examining Death Row
Inmates’ Right to Clergy Presence in the Execution
Chamber in Gutierrez v. Saenz
Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates
from the protections of the Constitution.1
I. Introduction
Ruben Gutierrez is a Texas prisoner on death row and a practicing
Catholic. 2 With his execution date imminent, he learned that the prison
system in which he is incarcerated had just changed its execution policy. 3
Suddenly, Mr. Gutierrez’s priest could no longer accompany him into the
execution chambers, contrary to the previous policy allowing for such
clergy presence. 4 In his final moments, the prison would not allow him to
receive what some call “Last Rites”—a traditional prayer practice of the
Catholic faith5—nor receive the spiritual comfort of his priest’s presence as
the State carries out his execution. 6 Mr. Gutierrez felt this deprivation was
an infringement on his right to practice his religion and to have peace in his
final moments.7
In its last few terms, the United States Supreme Court has shown an
interest in the religious rights of prisoners, including prisoners facing
execution. 8 The Court, however, has yet to clearly articulate what religious
rights prisoners retain up to their last moments in the execution chambers.
The Court’s recent summary dispositions in favor of prisoners’ religious
rights show a strong inclination to potentially rule in a future term that
prisoners have a right to a spiritual advisor’s presence with them in the
execution chamber when it is a sincere exercise of the prisoners’ religion. 9
The congressional intent behind the federal Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, and the last two decades of caselaw
since its enactment, support this right of prisoners. Prisons in all states with
1. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
2. Gutierrez v. Saenz, No. 1:19-cv-00185, slip op. at 9 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2020).
3. See id. at 4–5.
4. Gutierrez v. Saenz, 818 F. App’x 309, 313 (5th Cir. 2020).
5. Gutierrez, No. 1:19-cv-00185, slip op. at 11.
6. Gutierrez, 818 F. App’x at 314.
7. See id. at 313.
8. See Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661 (2019) (mem.); Murphy v. Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1475
(2019) (mem.); Gutierrez v. Saenz, 141 S. Ct. 1260 (2021) (mem.); Dunn v. Smith, 141 S.
Ct. 725 (2021) (mem.).
9. See supra note 8.

503

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

504

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:503

the death penalty should follow in this trend of restoring religious rights and
revise their execution policies to allow clergy to be present during
executions.
This Note argues that death row inmates should have the right to the
presence of clergy10 during their final moments in the execution chamber.
Part II of this Note details the legal history of prisoners’ religious rights,
including under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Part III explains the
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Gutierrez v. Saenz and its path to the United
States Supreme Court. Part IV further analyzes Gutierrez, examines the
need for and apparent willingness of the Supreme Court to provide
guidance to prisons across the nation, and suggests ways to mitigate prison
security concerns. Lastly, Part V reiterates the importance of deciding the
religious rights issues associated with prisoner executions.
II. Legal Landscape
A. Prisoners’ First Amendment Right to the Free Exercise of Religion
The First Amendment’s Free Exercise of Religion Clause restricts the
government from prohibiting a citizen’s free exercise of religion. 11 Courts
have long held that this right is so fundamental that prisoners
institutionalized in the United States retain the right, even though they are
not physically free citizens. 12 The United States Supreme Court has ruled
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the right to Free Exercise as
well.13 Thus, prisoners housed in state-run institutions may bring First
Amendment Free Exercise claims against state prison officials through 42
U.S.C. § 1983,14 widely expanding the Clause’s applicability. Under Free
Exercise protections, both federal and state prisons are constitutionally
bound.15

10. The term “clergy” is used in this Note and in the court proceedings discussed herein
to include spiritual advisors, priests, chaplains, and other professional religious leaders.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321–22 (1972); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
13. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
15. See id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss3/8

2022]

NOTE

505

Just as many constitutional protections are not absolute, a prisoner’s free
exercise of religion is not without reasonable limitations. 16 The leading
Supreme Court case qualifying and guiding prisoner constitutional claims
against prisons, including Free Exercise claims, is the 1987 case Turner v.
Safley.17 In Turner, inmates sought to get married, but a prison policy
prohibited marriage. 18 The Court recognized that marriage was a
constitutional right that had many benefits—including often being a
religious exercise—and held that the marriage ban was not reasonably
related to any legitimate prison interest.19 The marriage ban failed the first
prong of a four-prong test the Court laid out:
(1) whether a logical nexus exists between a prison policy or
regulation that substantially burdens a prisoner’s religious
exercise and the government’s asserted reason and legitimate,
neutral interest for enacting the policy or regulation;
(2) whether the prison can furnish “alternative means” of
accomplishing the prisoner’s religious exercise other than the
means requested;
(3) to what extent the prison’s potential accommodation of the
religious exercise will impact guards, other prisoners, and prison
resources in general; and
(4) whether there is a feasible alternative to the policy or
regulation.20
In Turner, the prison argued that “love triangles” raised a security concern,
but the Court found that a marriage ban was an exaggerated response and
that any rivalries stemming from “love triangles” were likely to develop
with or without formal marriage. 21 The Court has applied the Turner

16. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987) (stating that the right to marry, as
an exercise of religious faith, is “subject to substantial restrictions as a result of
incarceration”).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 82.
19. Id. at 96.
20. Id. at 89–90.
21. Id. at 98.
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framework to several cases since its issuance, 22 and the circuit courts use it
frequently. 23
When considering the first prong, a court that concludes the nexus
between the prison’s policy and the prison’s interest is remote enough to
render the policy “arbitrary or irrational” should invalidate the policy. 24 The
prison’s interest—its objective or reason for the policy—must be neutral
and legitimate. 25 The Supreme Court provided guidance for this prong in
Pell v. Procunier, explaining that objectives such as deterrence,
rehabilitation, and security were all legitimate and neutral.26
The second prong is an inquiry into whether alternative avenues exist for
religious practice. 27 For example, the Court upheld a policy that required
inmates to remain outside during part of the day and thus prevented Muslim
inmates from attending a Friday afternoon indoor religious service, finding
that the Muslim inmates were still able to participate in numerous other
Muslim ceremonies.28
Under the third prong, the court asks how requiring a policy
accommodation to allow the prisoner’s requested exercise of religion would
impact the prison individually and potentially other prisons. 29 When
considering an accommodation’s impact, courts should give reasonable
deference to prison officials due to their expertise and close understanding
of their own institutions.30 Courts do not, however, give total deference to
officials—courts subject challenged decisions and policies to constitutional
examination.31 A minimal impact on the prison is likely to assist the
prisoner’s Free Exercise claim, while a broad, negative impact may
authorize the prison to restrict the prisoner’s free exercise. 32
22. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132–36 (2003).
23. See, e.g., Small v. Wetzel, 528 F. App’x 202, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2013); Butts v.
Martin, 877 F.3d 571, 584–85, 587 (5th Cir. 2017); Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 499–501
(4th Cir. 2014).
24. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979).
25. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
26. 417 U.S. 817, 822–23 (1974).
27. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
28. O’Lone v. Est. of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350–52 (1987) (“The record establishes
that respondents are not deprived of all forms of religious exercise, but instead freely
observe a number of their religious obligations. . . . We think this ability on the part of
respondents to participate in other religious observances of their faith supports the
conclusion that the restrictions at issue here were reasonable.”).
29. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90–92.
30. Id. at 85.
31. Id. at 84.
32. See id. at 92, 98.
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The fourth prong involves a search for alternatives to the policy that
would allow for the religious exercise but still protect the prison’s interest. 33
To evaluate alternatives under the fourth prong, the Turner Court
considered the prison’s resources, staff capability, and potential risks of
alternatives. 34 If a reasonable alternative readily exists, and therefore all
four prongs support the prisoner’s claim, the court should strike down the
prison’s restrictive policy. 35 Overall, the policy of the Turner test is that
courts should ensure prison restrictions on religious exercise are not an
exaggerated or unnecessary response to a security goal or other objective. 36
B. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
Congress has expanded the religious rights of prisoners by enacting the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(“RLUIPA”).37 Under this federal statute, the government cannot arbitrarily
impose a substantial burden on a prisoner’s religious exercise, “even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability.” 38 If the government
does impose some burden, it must show that “imposition of the burden on
that person . . . (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.”39
Dozens of prisoners have litigated RLUIPA claims. 40 The Supreme Court
held that the RLUIPA legislation lawfully expanded religious protections
for prisoners, accommodating expressions beyond the minimal allowances
of the First Amendment.41 The Court also confirmed that RLUIPA applies
to both federal and state prisons. 42
Using the requirements stated in the statute’s text, the Court in Cutter v.
Wilkinson detailed a three-prong framework for evaluating RLUIPA

33. Id. at 90–91.
34. Id. at 91–93.
35. See id. at 98, 100.
36. See id. at 97–98.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
38. Id. § 2000cc-1(a).
39. Id. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)–(2).
40. See generally John J. Dvorske, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000cc et
seq.), 181 A.L.R. FED. 247 §§ 3, 7, 10, 11 (2002) (listing adjudications involving RLUIPA).
41. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719–20 (2005).
42. Id. at 720–21 (referencing state government institutions “in which the government
exerts a degree of control unparalleled in civilian society”).
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claims.43 In accordance with the statute’s text, the first prong of the test is
the “substantial burden” inquiry.44 While courts should look at the facts of
each case, a prison’s imposition of a substantial burden on a prisoner, often
in the form of a policy or regulation, must be more than just an
inconvenience to the prisoner.45 Rather, the burden must rise to the level of
a pressure to violate beliefs or modify religious expressions. 46 In evaluating
the prisoner’s religious exercise at issue, the act is not required to be an
exercise that is central or highly important to a religion; rather, the act may
be any exercise of a person’s sincere religious belief. 47
The second prong of the Cutter test analyzes whether the prison’s
claimed “compelling governmental interest” justifies the substantial
burden. 48 Under the third and final prong, the imposed burden must be the
least restrictive means available; 49 if other means to further the compelling
interest are available that would be less restrictive to the prisoner’s exercise
of religion, the prison must show the alternative means are too onerous. 50
Thus, the prison must prove that its policy or regulation is valid because it
lacks other feasible means of achieving its compelling interest. 51
One of the most noteworthy RLUIPA claims to reach the Court arose in
2015 in Holt v. Hobbs.52 An Arkansas state prisoner practicing the Muslim
faith brought a claim under RLUIPA, alleging that the state prison’s
grooming policy of banning prisoners’ growing of beards was a substantial
burden to the exercise of his Muslim faith. 53 The Supreme Court agreed,
applying the Cutter framework.54 The Court held that the grooming policy
did substantially burden the petitioner’s valid religious exercise, satisfying
43. See id. at 720.
44. Id. at 715–16.
45. See id. at 722–23.
46. Compare id. at 714, 722 (indicating that drug laws restricting sacramental use of
peyote and military dress codes prohibiting use of a Jewish yarmulke had not substantially
burdened religious conduct) with Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 361–62, 369 (2015) (holding
that a prison substantially burdened a Muslim prisoner’s religion by prohibiting him from
growing a beard, a practice that the prisoner believed was mandated by his religious faith).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
48. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 715.
49. Id.
50. 4 W. COLE DURHAM ET AL., RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 35:5 (2020).
51. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 728–30 (2014) (finding the
least-restrictive-means standard was not met where a defendant failed to demonstrate that
other, less-restrictive means were not feasible).
52. 574 U.S. 352 (2015).
53. Id. at 355–56.
54. Id. at 357, 369.
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the first prong, and that the burden was without proper justification,
satisfying the second prong.55 The policy was in place as a security
measure, both to prevent prisoners from hiding contraband in beards and to
ensure guards were able to consistently recognize prisoners by avoiding the
changing appearance facial hair may cause. 56 The Court found, however,
that the policy did not sufficiently further these security measures, and other
feasible means less restrictive on prisoner expression were available to
further the interest in security. 57 The Holt Court also reemphasized the
congressional intent behind RLUIPA, noting that the statute was meant to
provide broadened protections for prisoners’ religious expressions. 58
Consequently, the prison had to permit the Muslim prisoner to grow a onehalf-inch beard as an expression of his religious belief. 59
C. Circuit Split in Defining “Substantial Burden”
Holt may have caused more confusion than clarity on one issue: the
circuit courts are split in defining what impositions or restrictions
substantially burden a prisoner’s religious exercise, relevant to the first
prongs of both the Turner and Cutter tests.60 The Second, Third, Fourth,
and Sixth Circuits focus on whether a prison policy or regulation exerts
“substantial pressure” on a prisoner to modify his normal exercise of
religion.61 The Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, however, have
established a reasonableness inquiry and emphasize other factors, such as
intentional interference and how fundamental the exercise is to the
religion.62
The Tenth Circuit has taken a more unique approach and has established
its own test, focusing largely on the sincerity of the prisoner’s religious
belief. 63 While the RLUIPA inquiry must not concern the “centralness” of a
55. Id. at 356.
56. Id. at 363, 365.
57. Id. at 364–65, 367.
58. Id. at 356.
59. Id. at 369.
60. See DURHAM ET AL., supra note 50, § 35:5 (indicating a circuit split on the
“substantial burden” test); see also Khan v. Barela, 808 F. App’x 602, 615 n.12 (10th Cir.
2020) (explaining that Congress intended RLUIPA’s substantial burden definition to be
consistent with the Free Exercise jurisprudence definition of substantial burden, so the court
used essentially the same test for both claims).
61. See DURHAM ET AL., supra note 50, § 35:5.
62. Id. (citing Garner v. Muenchow, 715 F. App’x. 533, 536 (7th Cir. 2017) and Van
Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639, 656 (8th Cir. 2009)).
63. Id.
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belief, it does not bar inquiry into the sincerity of a professed belief. 64 The
Supreme Court has given some guidance on sincerity of belief, holding that
“religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection,”
but they should not be so outlandish as to be clearly non-religious.65 Simply
put, inquiry into sincerity involves assessing credibility subjectively, asking
whether the prisoner actually holds the belief he professes. 66
In the Tenth Circuit case Khan v. Barela, a Muslim prisoner claimed that
the prison substantially burdened his religious exercise when it would not
allow him a clock or prayer schedule and purposely only served him ham
and bread during the Ramadan holiday, knowing Muslims cannot eat
pork.67 The court easily found that the prisoner possessed a sincerely held
religious belief due to his proclamation of the Islamic faith and desire to
firmly adhere to its five pillars, including prayer, diet, and observation of
Ramadan. 68
The Tenth Circuit detailed three methods in which prisons impose
substantial burdens: (1) a prison prevents conduct motivated by a sincerely
held belief; (2) a prison substantially pressures a religious prisoner to
refrain from conduct motivated by a sincere belief, or to engage in conduct
conflicting with a sincere belief; and (3) a prison demands conduct
prohibited by a sincerely held belief.69 Further, the court clarified that “a
burden can be ‘substantial’ even if it does not compel or order the claimant
to betray a sincerely held religious belief.”70 In Khan, the Muslim prisoner

64. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (“RLUIPA bars inquiry into
whether a particular belief or practice is ‘central’ to a prisoner’s religion . . . .”).
65. Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of the Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714–15 (1981).
66. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 186 (1965) (enumerating an exception
from First Amendment protection for a “‘merely personal’ moral code”); Mosier v.
Maynard, 937 F.2d 1521, 1526 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that a “way of life . . . based upon
purely secular considerations” is not protectable as a religious belief); Yellowbear v.
Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 54 (10th Cir. 2014) (determining that the sincerity inquiry is, in
essence, a question of whether one’s claim to hold a religious belief is fraudulent); see also
Nathan S. Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1185, 1253 (2017)
(“The Constitution forbids the government from determining the accuracy or plausibility of a
claimant’s religious beliefs, but not from adjudicating the sincerity with which the claimant
holds them. Courts can and should evaluate a claimant’s sincerity, when an opponent puts it
in issue, to protect others from the costs of accommodating insincere religious claims.”).
67. Khan v. Barela, 808 F. App’x 602, 605 (10th Cir. 2020).
68. Id. at 614.
69. Id. at 614–15.
70. Id. at 615 (quoting Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 55).
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was substantially burdened by at least the first two methods. 71 First, the
prison’s depriving him of a clock and prayer schedule prevented him from
praying at the times necessary to his religious practice. 72 Second, the
prison’s provision of only religiously prohibited food, without alternatives,
presented pressure to engage in conduct against his sincere beliefs. 73 While
the Tenth Circuit dismissed the prisoner’s RLUIPA claim on purely
technical grounds,74 it found his Free Exercise claim a plausibly pled
substantial burden on his sincere religious beliefs. 75
The Tenth Circuit’s substantial burden framework provided a sound
analysis tending to favor the prisoner’s legitimate, sincere beliefs.
Generally, since the enactment of RLUIPA, courts have followed this trend
in deciding many cases in favor of prisoners, expanding prisoners’ religious
rights.76 This expansion, however, has not necessarily been the trend when
death-row prisoners seek to exercise their religious rights during their
executions, and prisons argue even more forcefully for deference to ensure
security. 77 In the last two terms, four death-row prisoner religious exercise
cases have made it to the Supreme Court, with hopes the Court will resolve

71. Id. at 614–15.
72. See id. at 614.
73. Id. at 615.
74. Id. at 605–06 (noting the prisoner had requested damages rather than equitable
relief, and RLUIPA’s only remedy is equitable relief).
75. Id. at 615–16.
76. E.g., Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t Crim. Just., 703 F.3d 781, 790, 792 (5th Cir.
2012); Ali v. Stephens, 822 F.3d 776, 785, 794 (5th Cir. 2016); Ware v. Louisiana Dep’t
Corr., 866 F.3d 263, 268, 274 (5th Cir. 2017); Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 200–01, 204
(4th Cir. 2012); Fox v. Washington, 949 F.3d 270, 280 (6th Cir. 2020); Native Am. Council
of Tribes v. Weber, 750 F.3d 742, 749–50 (8th Cir. 2014); Nance v. Miser, 700 F. App’x
629, 633 (9th Cir. 2017) (mem.); see also John J. Dvorske, Annotation, Validity,
Construction, and Operation of Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000cc et seq.), 181 A.L.R. Fed. 247 § 8 (2002 & Supp. 2021).
77. See, e.g., Ray v. Dunn, No. 2:19-CV-88-WKW, 2019 WL 418105, at *5–6 (M.D.
Ala. Feb. 1, 2019) (“The State has compelling interests ‘of the highest order’ in maintaining
the solemnity, safety, and security of Ray’s execution[,] . . . so strong that the State cannot
permit even a slight chance of interference with an execution.”), rev’d, 915 F.3d 689 (11th
Cir. 2019), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 661 (2019) (mem.); Murphy v. Collier, 942 F.3d 704, 707
(5th Cir. 2019) (focusing on the State’s justifications for its disparate treatment of prisoners’
religious practices rather than on whether Murphy’s individual right was substantially
burdened).
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the question of what religious rights prisoners retain in the execution
chambers.78
D. Murphy v. Collier
In March 2019, Texas death-row inmate Patrick Henry Murphy
requested that the United States Supreme Court grant his application for
stay of execution.79 The Buddhist prisoner brought claims under the First
Amendment and RLUIPA, based on Texas’s refusal to allow a Buddhist
priest into the execution chambers. 80 The Supreme Court overturned the
Fifth Circuit’s denial of a stay of execution, granting the stay unless Texas
would permit a Buddhist priest into the chambers to accompany Mr.
Murphy.81
Justice Kavanaugh issued a concurring opinion and concluded that
Texas’s policy was likely discriminatory because it allowed Christian and
Muslim priests into the execution chambers, but not Buddhist priests, or
clergy of other religions.82 Justice Kavanaugh suggested that a change in
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) policy to either allow
or bar all clergy from the execution chambers, regardless of religious
affiliation, might cure the issue in Murphy.83
III. Statement of the Case: Gutierrez v. Saenz
Following from Murphy v. Collier and the TDCJ’s resulting changed
policy, another Fifth Circuit case, Gutierrez v. Saenz,84 made its way to the
Supreme Court of the United States. 85 Mr. Gutierrez, a Texas death-row

78. Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661 (2019) (mem.); Murphy v. Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1475
(2019) (mem.); Gutierrez v. Saenz, 141 S. Ct. 1260 (2021) (mem.); Dunn v. Smith, 141 S.
Ct. 725 (2021) (mem.).
79. Murphy, 139 S. Ct. at 1475.
80. Id. at 1478 (Alito, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1475.
82. Id. at 1476 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 1475–76 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (framing the policy as a violation of
equal treatment, but likely not a violation of RLUIPA or the Free Exercise Clause). A month
after the TDCJ revised the policy, Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
issued an additional statement in support of the revision, forecasting compliance with
RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause due to the prison’s compelling security interest. Id. at
1476–77.
84. 818 F. App’x 309 (5th Cir. 2020).
85. Gutierrez v. Saenz, 141 S. Ct. 1260 (2021).
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inmate, challenged the TDCJ’s new policy for violating his religious
exercise rights.86
A. Facts and Procedural History
Before Murphy v. Collier, in accordance with a TDCJ policy adopted in
the 1980s, Texas had allowed TDCJ chaplains to accompany inmates into
the execution chamber and remain through the inmates’ final moments. 87
But a few days after the TDCJ heard the Supreme Court’s rulings and
opinions in Murphy v. Collier, it decided to act on Justice Kavanaugh’s
suggestion and change its execution chamber policy. 88 On April 2, 2019,
TDCJ officials promulgated a revised policy that prohibited any and all
clergy presence in the execution chamber during executions: “TDCJ
Chaplains and Ministers/Spiritual Advisors designated by the offender may
observe the execution only from the witness rooms.”89
Ruben Gutierrez is a practicing Catholic inmate, convicted and on death
row in Texas for the murder of Escolastica Harrison. 90 Promptly after
receiving his execution date and learning that the prison now prohibited his
priest’s presence and Last Rites prayer during his execution, he filed prison
grievances and eventually a complaint in federal court.91 Mr. Gutierrez
challenged the revised TDCJ execution policy as violating his religious
rights.92 Although the new policy allowed a prisoner to meet with a TDCJemployed or otherwise approved spiritual advisor before the execution
process begins, it did not allow a chaplain into the execution chambers with
the prisoner.93 As Mr. Gutierrez correctly noted, the prison previously
allowed clergy presence in the chamber, but it now only allows its own
security staff into the chamber.94 Mr. Gutierrez, as a prisoner awaiting
execution, claimed this newly revised TDCJ policy violates his First

86. Gutierrez, 818 F. App’x at 311.
87. Gutierrez v. Saenz, No. 1:19-cv-00185, slip op. at 3–4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2020).
88. Id. at 3 n.3.
89. Id. at 4–5 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 9; Gutierrez, 818 F. App’x at 311.
91. See Gutierrez, No. 1:19-cv-00185, slip op. at 4–5, 9 (noting that the prison policy
changed on April 2, 2019, and Mr. Gutierrez filed his complaint on September 26, 2019);
Gutierrez, 818 F. App’x at 311.
92. Gutierrez, 818 F. App’x at 311.
93. Id. at 313.
94. Id.
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Amendment right to free exercise of religion. 95 Additionally, he purported
to have a claim under the more expansive RLUIPA. 96
At the trial court level, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas found that Mr. Gutierrez’s claims had merit to survive the
TDCJ’s motion to dismiss, and the court stayed his execution on June 9,
2020, to allow him to litigate his religious claims. 97 The Texas Attorney
General’s Office appealed and moved to vacate the stay on grounds that
Mr. Gutierrez’s claims were without merit.98 The Fifth Circuit reviewed the
case for abuse of discretion and disagreed with the district court, vacating
the stay and reinstating the execution. 99
B. The Fifth Circuit’s Reasoning
The Fifth Circuit applied four factors the United States Supreme Court
has set out for granting a stay:
(1) whether the prisoner has made a strong case that he may succeed
on his claims;
(2) whether the prisoner will be “irreparably injured” if not granted
stay;
(3) whether a stay would substantially injure other interested parties;
and
(4) public interest.100
The first two factors—the prisoner’s likelihood of success and his potential
for irreparable injury—are the weightiest.101
The court first evaluated Mr. Gutierrez’s likelihood for success on his
First Amendment claims. The Fifth Circuit, in accordance with the lower
court and circuit precedent, applied the Turner framework to Mr.
Gutierrez’s Free Exercise claim and concluded that he failed to make a
strong showing for success on the merits.102 Specifically, Mr. Gutierrez
argued that the TDCJ’s old policy would have allowed a TDCJ-employed
Christian chaplain to accompany him into the chambers, satisfying his
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 311.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 314–15.
Id. at 311 (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)).
Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.
Gutierrez, 818 F. App’x at 313–14.
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asserted right.103 The TDCJ changed its policy upon the suggestion of
Justice Kavanaugh in Murphy v. Collier to permit no clergy.104 Without
systematically walking through the Turner factors, the court instead
summarily concluded that, despite Mr. Gutierrez’s “strong religious
arguments,” his legal arguments were lacking, as he was “unlikely to
establish that TDCJ’s execution policy is not ‘reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.’”105
The court then evaluated the RLUIPA claim. 106 Under the federal statute,
a government actor cannot substantially burden a prisoner’s exercise of
religion unless the government furthers its own compelling interest using
the least restrictive means available. 107 Mr. Gutierrez argued that the TDCJ
policy imposed a substantial burden—namely, that he would not be able to
have spiritual comfort and guidance from a chaplain while dying, which is a
practice of his Catholic faith.108 The court held that Mr. Gutierrez also
failed on this claim to show the state had imposed a substantial burden on
his faith because the policy fell short of “truly pressur[ing] the adherent to
significantly modify his religious behavior and significantly violate his
religious beliefs.”109 The court noted that the practice Mr. Gutierrez
requested was perhaps a “spiritual comfort” that is a benefit not otherwise
available. 110
According to the court, Mr. Gutierrez failed on the first of the four stay
factors: he had not made a strong showing on his First Amendment or
RLUIPA claims.111 The court quickly disposed of the final three factors,
concluding that the district court erred in granting Mr. Gutierrez a stay of
execution. 112 Thus, the court vacated the stay.113

103. Id. at 314.
104. Gutierrez v. Saenz, No. 1:19-cv-00185, slip op. at 4–5 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2020);
see also Murphy v. Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1475, 1476–77 (2019) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring).
105. Gutierrez, 818 F. App’x at 314 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
106. Id.
107. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
108. See Gutierrez, 818 F. App’x at 314.
109. Id. (quoting Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 313–14.
112. Id. at 314–15.
113. Id. at 315.
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C. Appeal to the Supreme Court
Mr. Gutierrez persisted in pursuing his claims on the merits; he appealed
to the United States Supreme Court for an emergency stay of execution and
petitioned for certiorari on his claims. 114 The Supreme Court reviewed the
petition for emergency stay of execution and granted Mr. Gutierrez’s stay,
pending the Court’s decision on whether to grant certiorari on the Fifth
Circuit case.115
The Court also provided a surprising additional instruction to the trial
court, the Southern District of Texas: “The District Court should promptly
determine, based on whatever evidence the parties provide, whether serious
security problems would result if a prisoner facing execution is permitted to
choose the spiritual adviser the prisoner wishes to have in his immediate
presence during the execution.”116 Legal journalists have noted this special
instruction from the Court, indicating it “follows a series of disputes from
last term that caused rifts among the justices over what religious rights
prisoners have in their final moments.”117
D. The District Court’s Finding
Following the Supreme Court’s order, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas considered evidence and briefs from both
parties on the issue of potential security concerns posed by the presence of
outside spiritual advisors in the execution chamber.118 In deciding this
narrow question, the district court issued a written opinion, which included
its reasoning and a summary of both parties’ submitted evidence after
expedited discovery.119
The district court, evaluating the evidence submitted, emphasized the
differences in the development of the TDCJ’s 1985 execution policy and
the development of the new 2019 policy.120 Specifically, the 1985 policy,
which allowed TDCJ chaplains in the chamber, took months to develop and
went through several drafts.121 “In contrast, the TDCJ implemented its April
114. See Gutierrez v. Saenz, 141 S. Ct. 127, 127–28 (2020) (mem.).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 128.
117. Jerome Ashton, Supreme Court Halts Execution Without Chaplain in Death
Chamber, BLOOMBERG L. (June 17, 2020, 6:27 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/uslaw-week/supreme-court-halts-execution-without-chaplain-in-death-chamber.
118. Gutierrez v. Saenz, No. 1:19-cv-00185, slip op. at 1 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2020).
119. See generally id.
120. Id. at 3–7.
121. Id. at 3–4, 7.
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2019 policy without any comprehensive study or intense review.” 122 While
the TDCJ now claims security concerns were the main reason for
disallowing spiritual advisors into the chamber, only “some discussion was
had about security risks.”123 Further, the TDCJ provided no evidence of
“specific security concerns [it] discussed.”124 The court also noted Mr.
Gutierrez’s evidence of previously approved TDCJ chaplains’ willingness
to participate in his final moments 125 and the Federal Bureau of Prisons’
allowance of approved clergy into federal execution chambers. 126
On November 24, 2020, the district court issued its finding that “no
serious security problems would result if a prisoner facing execution is
permitted to have his chosen spiritual adviser in his immediate presence
during the execution.”127 The court also concluded that the TDCJ raised no
evidence of relevant, documented security incidents involving clergy;
rather, the TDCJ merely raised “speculative concerns” regarding only
outside advisors.128 Lastly, the court found that the change in policy “was
not driven by research, careful study, or meaningful evaluation.” 129 The
court found that TDCJ officials gave great weight to Justice Kavanaugh’s
concurring statement in Murphy, supposedly interpreting it as a directive,
not just a suggestion. 130 Justice Kavanaugh opined that the TDCJ had at
least two means to possibly remedy the Murphy Establishment Clause
issue: either allow all religious advisors into the execution chambers, or
allow none. 131 The TDCJ clearly implemented the latter suggestion,
prohibiting the presence of all religious advisors during executions. 132 The
district court filed these conclusions with the Supreme Court, and the
parties thereafter filed supplemental briefs at the Supreme Court.133

122. Id. at 7.
123. Id.
124. Id. (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 10.
126. Id. at 12–13.
127. Id. at 1–2.
128. Id. at 2.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 7 (citing Murphy v. Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1475, 1480 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring)).
131. Murphy, 139 S. Ct. at 1476–77 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
132. Gutierrez, No. 1:19-cv-00185, slip op. at 4.
133. See Supplemental Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Gutierrez v.
Saenz, 141 S. Ct. 1260 (2021) (mem.) (No. 19-8695); Supplemental Brief, Gutierrez, 141 S.
Ct. 1260 (2021) (mem.) (No. 19-8695).
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E. Current Status Before the Supreme Court
In briefing to the Supreme Court, Texas argued it has a security-based
interest in keeping uncleared and unnecessary persons out of the
chambers.134 Mr. Gutierrez, however, argued that Texas’s old policy
allowing clergy in the execution chambers existed for decades with no
security incidents.135 On January 25, 2021, approximately two months after
the requested district court findings on security concerns, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari but summarily disposed of the case, not ruling
definitively on the existence of a right to clergy presence. 136 The Court did
rule in Mr. Gutierrez’s favor, however, vacating the Fifth Circuit’s order
and remanding the case back to the district court with instructions to rule on
the merits of the religious claims 137 in light of the district court’s factual
finding of “no serious security problems.”138
IV. Analysis
A. The History and Evolution of the TDCJ Policy
In Texas’s response to Mr. Gutierrez’s petition for certiorari, Texas
claimed that prison security is unarguably a compelling government
interest, but it also acknowledged that Murphy prompted the change in the
policy.139 Mr. Gutierrez noted that the change was for the “acknowledged
purpose of avoiding the obligation to allow . . . a minister to a Buddhist
prisoner.”140 Because the TDCJ only employed Christian, Jewish, Native
American, and Muslim Chaplains, but not a Buddhist Chaplain, the TDCJ
argued that its only options after the Supreme Court’s holding in Murphy
were to either hire chaplains for each of the twenty-five different religions
represented on Texas’s death row,141 or allow no chaplains in the
chamber.142 Mr. Gutierrez argued that the TDCJ essentially attempted to
avoid accommodating prisoners at the risk of denying their rights to free
134. See Brief in Opposition at 26, Gutierrez, 141 S. Ct. 1260 (2021) (mem.) (No. 198695).
135. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Gutierrez, 141 S. Ct. 1260 (2021) (mem.)
(No. 19-8695).
136. Gutierrez, 141 S. Ct. at 1260–61.
137. Id.
138. Gutierrez v. Saenz, No. 1:19-cv-00185, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2020).
139. Brief in Opposition, supra note 134, at 14, 24.
140. Gutierrez, No. 1:19-cv-00185, at 5 n.8.
141. See id. at 4, 9.
142. Id. at 4.
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religious exercise. 143 He argued that “chaplains have been present for
hundreds of executions in Texas. But Texas changed the rules . . . in order
to defeat a charge of religious discrimination brought by another inmate
[Mr. Murphy] who practiced Buddhism.”144
B. Merits of Petitioner’s Religious Exercise Claims
Mr. Gutierrez argued the new TDCJ policy deprived him of the longallowed “religious consolation” that a priest provides to the dying, which
the TDCJ previously recognized and provided to hundreds of death-row
inmates.145 He argued that the new policy substantially burdened his
exercise of religion, forcing him to modify his religious practice and
preference, which is “his belief that the presence of a chaplain in the
execution chamber will aid his passage from this life to the next and assist
him in reaching Heaven.”146
The substantial-burden inquiry is the first prong in evaluating both
RLUIPA and Free Exercise claims. 147 Applying the Tenth Circuit’s
methodical approach significantly helps in this inquiry,148 especially as
applied to death-row inmates. Society has grown more concerned with
humane and peaceful executions, and an approach favoring a prisoner’s
exercise of a sincere religious belief during execution is in accord with a
peaceful and humane death. 149 The Tenth Circuit inquiry first requires the
prisoner to show a sincerely held religious belief. 150 Mr. Gutierrez
emphasized that the lower courts did not contest or question the sincerity of
his belief that clergy presence at death would assist him in reaching
Heaven, as it is a reasonable and common belief established in Christian
tradition. 151 While it did not question the sincerity of the belief, the Fifth
Circuit did seemingly minimize it as “some benefit that is not otherwise

143. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 135, at 15.
144. Id.
145. Reply in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Gutierrez v. Saenz, 141 S.
Ct. 1260 (2021) (mem.) (No. 19-8695).
146. Id. at 5.
147. See DURHAM ET AL., supra note 50, § 35:5.
148. See, e.g., Khan v. Barela, 808 F. App’x 602 (10th Cir. 2020); Yellowbear v.
Lampert, 741 F.3d 48 (10th Cir. 2014).
149. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Texas Catholic Conference of Bishops in Support of
Petitioner at 2, Gutierrez v. Saenz, 141 S. Ct. 1260 (2021) (mem.) (No. 19-8695).
150. See DURHAM ET AL., supra note 50, § 35:5
151. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 135, at 19; Brief Amicus Curiae of the
Texas Catholic Conference of Bishops, supra note 149, at 7, 14.
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generally available.”152 Mr. Gutierrez claims this assessment was
unwarranted and that it ignored the fact that the TDCJ’s old policy did
make prison chaplains generally available to all inmates in the execution
chamber.153
The second part of the Tenth Circuit’s substantial-burden inquiry is
clearly satisfied. The TDCJ prevented conduct motivated by Mr.
Gutierrez’s sincerely held belief or put substantial pressure on him to
refrain from the conduct motivated by his sincere belief, amounting to a
substantial burden either way.
Respondents at the TDCJ dispute Mr. Gutierrez’s claim that his religious
exercise was substantially burdened, arguing the prison still allowed
inmates to meet with clergy before entering the execution chambers,
permitting religious exercise, not substantially burdening it. 154 They
claimed the new restriction barring clergy from the execution chambers
would only be a substantial burden if they were preventing an act a
prisoner’s religion dictated or demanded, not just a religious consolation. 155
Mr. Gutierrez claimed this argument was contrary to the weight of caselaw,
which concludes the religious exercise does not have to be central to the
religion to be sincerely held.156
C. Merits of the Respondent’s Security Concerns Defense
In both RLUIPA and Free Exercise inquiries, the prison must show they
have a legitimate interest justifying any substantial burden on prisoners’
religious exercise. Respondent TDCJ officials argued that the TDCJ, as a
prison administrator, should receive deference when “establishing
necessary regulations to maintain security” and the prison policy fit this
security interest.157 The TDCJ bolstered this request for deference with a
federalism argument, claiming the Court should not be involved in the
TDCJ’s “screening and approval of requested spiritual advisors, e.g., in the
event TDCJ determines a particular spiritual advisor does not meet its
criteria.”158 The TDCJ emphasized the particular experience and training of
152. Gutierrez v. Saenz, 818 F. App’x 309, 314 (5th Cir. 2020).
153. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 135, at 19.
154. Brief in Opposition, supra note 134, at 18–19.
155. See id. at 20–21 (arguing that Catholicism does not mandate contemporaneous
administration of last rites as a person is dying).
156. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005).
157. Brief in Opposition, supra note 134, at 10.
158. Id. at 25 (citing Cutter, 544 U.S. at 726; Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 362 (1996)
(supporting the proposition that “federal courts are not to become ‘enmeshed in the minutiae
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its own chaplains, which qualified them to be present in the chamber before
2019, and that outside clergy would not have the requisite training, which
raises a security concern. 159 The TDCJ also sought to avoid outside clergy
becoming aware of the identities of anyone part of the lethal injection team,
as anonymity is important to the integrity of the execution process. 160 The
Court initially seemed to find some merit to these TDCJ concerns as well,
based on its order to the district court regarding the security argument, but it
is unlikely these concerns could withstand further court scrutiny.
Petitioner Gutierrez argued these concerns are speculative and that his
situation did not implicate these “outside clergy” concerns, as he would be
satisfied with a previously acceptable and TDCJ-employed priest attending
his execution.161 The TDCJ stated in its Murphy v. Collier brief that TDCJ
chaplains are “truly dedicated to TDCJ’s interests” and act professionally in
the execution chambers.162 In providing evidence to the district court, the
TDCJ also could not produce any evidence of security problems arising
from chaplain behavior in the execution chamber under its former policy
allowing chaplains in the chamber.163 In fact, over the course of 560
executions guided by the former policy, there were no chaplain security
incidents.164 Additionally, evidence showing TDCJ chaplains received
extremely minimal execution chamber-specific training165 combined with
the lack of TDCJ chaplain incidents led the district court to conclude that
even outside clergy presence in the chamber did not pose serious security
concerns.166
D. Federal and Other State Execution Chamber Policies
As the district court noted, since the federal government began carrying
out executions again in 2020, it has executed thirteen people167 and has
of prison operations’”); Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 338 (5th Cir. 2004) (supporting the
proposition that “federal courts ‘are not to micromanage state prisons.’”)).
159. See Gutierrez v. Saenz, No. 1:19-cv-00185, slip op. at 11–12, (S.D. Tex. Nov. 24,
2020).
160. Id. at 24.
161. Id. at 11 n.10; Supplemental Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 133, at 4.
162. Reply in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 145, at 7.
163. Gutierrez, No. 1:19-cv-00185, at 7.
164. Id. at 3.
165. Id. at 26. The preparatory “training” for TDCJ chaplains selected for execution
chamber duties consisted essentially of just a walk-through. Id.
166. Id. at 29.
167. Capital Punishment., FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/history/
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allowed at least ten of them to have the clergy of their choice present in the
execution chamber, following a request and advanced approval. 168
Ultimately, the Gutierrez district court found the federal execution policy
held great weight against the TDCJ’s argument and the TDCJ did not
“distinguish between the circumstances surrounding a federal execution and
one in Texas.”169 Before the execution of federal prisoner Daniel Lewis
Lee, a follower of the Asatru pagan religious sect, Lee requested his
priestess be allowed into the execution chamber with him. 170 The Federal
Bureau of Prisons agreed, provided the priestess with written instructions,
and promised to follow up with her “to further discuss logistical details and
answer any questions.”171 The prison staff escorted the priestess into the
chamber and the execution was carried out without incident. 172 Even those
most familiar with the TDCJ policy recognize that the Federal Bureau of
Prison’s policy is a successful example of “how it is possible to allow
outside spiritual advisors of an inmate’s choice under specific guidelines
and accompanied by security escorts.”173
While most states have either outlawed the death penalty or do not
actively use it, some states that do actively use the death penalty have
allowed clergy into the execution chambers. 174 Several state execution
policies, including Oklahoma’s policy as written, do not expressly bar
clergy from the chambers but also do not expressly allow for clergy in the
chambers.175 Oklahoma seemingly allowed clergy, including outside clergy,
federal_executions.jsp (last visited Nov. 8, 2021).
168. Id. at 12–13; Dunn v. Smith, 141 S. Ct. 725, 726 (2021) (mem.) (Kagan, J.,
concurring).
169. Gutierrez, No. 1:19-cv-00185, at 23.
170. Id. at 12–13.
171. Id. at 13.
172. See id.; Michael Balsamo, First Federal Execution in 17 Years; Another Set
Wednesday, AP NEWS (July 14, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/health-arkansas-in-statewire-ar-state-wire-virus-outbreak-638826b00bba1b389756126e4cfae97a.
173. Id. at 12.
174. Maryland, Georgia, Texas, and Tennessee allowed chaplains in the execution
chambers in 2014. State Weighs Allowing Inmates’ Own Clergy During Execution,
CUMBERLAND TIMES-NEWS (Aug. 7, 2014), https://www.times-news.com/news/local_news/
state-weighs-allowing-inmates-own-clergy-during-execution/article_3bff0c86-338f-5b81b6e7-29b5139b1b17.html.
175. Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Dakota neither explicitly permit nor bar clergy from the
execution chamber. Opposition to Emergency Application to Vacate Injunction of Execution
at 15 n.10, Dunn v. Smith, 141 S. Ct. 725 (2021) (mem.); see also OKLA. DEP’T OF CORR.,
EXECUTION PROCEDURES § VI(C)(4) (2020).
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until an event in which an outside clergyperson arrived at the prison
wearing an ankle monitor—apparently having been on probation for a
crime. 176 While this may seem the exact kind of security incident states like
Texas wish to avoid by prohibiting clergy altogether, a simple preparatory
security measure, such as a background check on the clergyperson, would
prevent such an incident. Until Texas changed its policy in 2019, the state
was a prime example for ensuring safe executions while still allowing
chaplain presence and effectively preserving religious freedom. 177
The federal government’s advance security measures, including
background screenings and providing instruction, have proven efficient and
successful while still furthering prisons’ valid interests in security. States
wishing to carry out executions have these proven alternative means to
ensure security—means much less restrictive than completely barring
clergy. Justice Kagan’s concurring opinion in Dunn v. Smith, the most
recent Supreme Court case ruling on the clergy issue against an Alabama
prison, is forceful and prophetic:
[P]ast practice, in Alabama and elsewhere, shows that a prison
may ensure security without barring all clergy members from the
execution chamber. . . . Nowhere, as far as I can tell, has the
presence of a clergy member (whether state-appointed or
independent) disturbed an execution. That record “suggests that
[Alabama] could satisfy its security concerns through a means
less restrictive” than its current prohibition. 178
E. Gutierrez Resolved?
Within a few months of the Supreme Court’s remand of Mr. Gutierrez’s
case back down to the district court with instructions to rule on the merits of
the religious claims, and shortly following the Court’s February 2021
direction in Dunn v. Smith, the TDCJ backtracked its execution policy. 179
176. Brian Witte, Md. Weighs Allowing Inmates’ Own Clergy at Death, WASH. TIMES
(July 19, 2010), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jul/19/md-clergy-deathchamber-proposal/.
177. See id.; Gutierrez, No. 1:19-cv-00185, at 3. Before Texas changed its policy, no
chaplain had caused an incident in any of Texas’s executions since 1982. Id.
178. Dunn v. Smith, 141 S. Ct. 725, 725–26 (2021) (mem.) (Kagan, J., concurring)
(quoting Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 368–69 (2015)).
179. Dallas Morning News Editorial, Opinion, Texas Wisely Ends Its Indefensible Policy
of Barring Clergy from the Execution Chamber, DALL. MORNING NEWS (May 5, 2021, 8:18
AM), https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/2021/05/05/texas-wisely-ends-its-inde
fensible-policy-of-barring-clergy-from-the-execution-chamber/ [hereinafter Texas Wisely
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On April 21, 2021, it announced reinstatement of authorized clergy
presence in the state’s execution chamber, this time explicitly allowing a
prisoner’s selected outside spiritual advisor if cleared in advance. 180
Although the change in policy in effect granted Mr. Gutierrez his requested
relief and rendered his claims moot, the Supreme Court’s hesitancy in
pronouncing a broad rule as of spring 2022 still may leave states with the
option to proceed with executions without clergy presence.
In November 2021, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Ramirez
v. Collier, in which another Texas death row prisoner claimed his RLUIPA
rights would be violated by the TDCJ if he were denied his pastor’s touch
and audible prayer in the execution chamber. 181 The Court ruled in favor of
the prisoner, holding that he was likely to succeed on his RLUIPA claims
and that Texas, on the record presented to the Court, had not shown that
denying the prisoner’s specific request was the least restrictive means of
furthering the state’s compelling interest. 182 The Court emphasized that
RLUIPA claims require case-by-case consideration, but it also advised
states to implement policies addressing clergy issues likely to arise in
executions:
If spiritual advisors are to be admitted into the execution
chamber, it would also seem reasonable to require some training
on procedures, including any restrictions on their movements or
conduct. When a spiritual advisor would enter and must leave
could be spelled out. If the advisor is to touch the prisoner, the
State might also specify where and for how long. And, as noted,
if audible prayer is to occur, a variety of considerations might be
set forth in advance to avoid disruption. It may also be
reasonable to document the advisor’s advance agreement to
comply with any restrictions. If States adopt clear rules in
advance, it should be the rare case that requires last-minute
resort to the federal courts.183

Ends]; Amy Howe, Court Blocks Execution, Will Weigh in on Inmate’s Religious-Liberty
Claims, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 8, 2021, 10:47 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/
2021/09/court-blocks-execution-will-weigh-in-on-inmates-religious-liberty-claims/.
180. Texas Wisely Ends, supra note 179.
181. Ramirez v. Collier, 142 S. Ct. 1264, 1274 (2022).
182. Id. at 1281.
183. Id. at 1283 (citation omitted).
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V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s recent orders in favor of prisoners’ religious rights
should prompt prison policy revisions throughout the states, especially
considering the Court’s recognition of the Gutierrez district court’s findings
favoring clergy presence in execution chambers. In the absence of an
outright ruling declaring clergy presence a right or a clear directive from
Congress declaring such, all state prisons should certainly see the Court’s
recent decisions as a guide and Texas’s back-and-forth policy revision
incident as a warning. While Oklahoma and other states that the Court has
not directly ordered to allow clergy presence may choose to continue to bar
clergy—and consequently risk further expensive litigation on the issue—
perhaps the more reasonable and proactive policy going forward is to
expressly allow clergy presence upon profession of a sincere religious
belief. The Tenth Circuit’s sincerity approach should guide prison
administrators and courts in the inquiry. Because of the conflict between
federal and state execution policies and the rising number of prisoner
claims involving the fundamental right to free exercise, there may still be
need for the Supreme Court to define clearly what religious rights prisoners
enjoy when the State carries out capital punishment. Until the Court makes
a direct ruling applicable to all prisons, prisons should take the proactive
approach and revise their policies to allow for clergy presence. This
approach would follow the trend of modern courts granting more and more
religious freedoms to prisoners since RLUIPA’s enactment in 2000.
Government should not unjustifiably infringe on anyone’s right to a
peaceful death.
Sarah B. Conley
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